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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
YESENIA TAPIA LEON
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 48303-2020
Cassia Co. Case Nos.
CR16-19-1043

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Leon failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her?

Leon Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
The state charged Leon with one count of felony possession of methamphetamine and
one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana.

(R., pp.13-15.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement with the state, Leon pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the
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misdemeanor charge was dismissed. (R., pp.41-49, 84.) The district imposed a sentence of three
years with zero years fixed. (R., p.78.) Leon timely appealed. (R., pp.90-91.)
Leon argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Review of the record and application of the
relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
Where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a
clear abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8,
368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “‘In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of
discretion by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324
(1982)).
Likewise, “[p]robation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 192601(4). “The decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is committed to the district
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judge’s discretion,” and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293, 298 (2001) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,
648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998)); State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981);
State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A court’s decision
“to refuse probation will not be deemed a ‘clear abuse of discretion’ if the trial court has
sufficient information to determine that the same would be inappropriate.” State v. Chapman,
120 Idaho 466, 472, 816 P.2d 1023, 1029 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 687
P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984). See also I.C. § 19-2521.
Applying those standards here, the district court was well within its discretion to
conclude that probation, or even a retained jurisdiction, was inappropriate. The court noted that
after Leon pleaded guilty in this case, she violated the conditions of pretrial release prior to
sentencing by testing positive for drugs and failing to appear for drug tests. (R., pp.50, 54-72;
8/10/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-21.)

And while true that the presentence investigator initially

recommended a rider (PSI, p.17), the district court took a dim view of that recommendation after
Leon did not “not show[] up for sentencing” in September of 2019, and absconded until she was
arrested on the ensuing bench warrant in July of 2020 (R., pp.72, 77; 8/10/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-6).
When a defendant accrues a series of pretrial release violations, and fails to appear for her
own sentencing hearing, it is unsurprising those facts will be held against her in considering
amenability for probation. (8/10/20 Tr., p.11, L.5 – p.12, L.3 (where the court concluded there
was “no way” Leon would go on probation).) All of this should be no surprise to Leon, as the
district court warned her, before releasing her on her own recognizance, that “if you violate
again, it’s going to make it much harder for the Court to seriously consider probation if I see you
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back here in orange.” (6/25/19 Tr., p.18, Ls.7-20 (also warning Leon she had “a lot to lose” in
the form of “a probation recommendation,” and so “enough said”).)
Thus, based on Leon’s failure to comply with the conditions of her release and the court
orders in this case, it was reasonable for the court to decline to order probation:
[R]ight now the defendant is not an appropriate candidate for probation.
So in considering the factors in Idaho Code [Section] 19-2521, the Court is not
going to follow the plea agreement. I think all the terms and conditions have
changed. I think the defendant is an undue risk. The defendant certainly will not
comply with probation, and there’s a good chance there’s an undue risk the
defendant will commit another crime. I think a lesser sentence would depreciate
the seriousness of the offense.
(8/10/20 Tr., p.12, L.20 – p.13, L.6.)
Leon argues on appeal that her “substance abuse issues and willingness to participate in
treatment support her request to be released onto probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) However,
the record here shows Leon’s unwillingness to participate in court-ordered drug testing after two
months of release into the community (see R., pp.50, 54-72), which does not bode well for any
long term success on probation.
Furthermore, the district court was well aware of Leon’s “obvious[] substance abuse
issues.” (8/10/20 Tr., p.11, L.4.) The court gave those issues due weight at sentencing by
crafting a sentence that, in its “best estimate,” would “mete out punishment with some
rehabilitation,” but that would “leave a lot of it in the Department of Corrections’ hands.”
(8/10/20 Tr., p.13, L.21 – p.14, L.7 (clarifying that with the “zero years fixed,” the Department
of Correction would put Leon “essentially through a program like a rider”).) Idaho’s appellate
courts do “not presume the district court did not consider the information before it, as the district
court said it did,” nor will they “reweigh the evidence on appeal from a discretionary sentencing
decision.” State v. Deboer, Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 47840, *5 (filed January 28,
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2021 (opinion not yet final), citing State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316
(2011)). This Court should not do so here.
Leon additionally claims that “the absence of any prior felony convictions also supports”
her “request for community supervision,” as it is well established that a “‘first offender should be
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.5 (quoting
State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673, 962 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1998).)
Some first-offender leniency certainly made sense in Hoskins, but the defendant there
“had a prior criminal record consisting solely of traffic offenses, and he had no prior exposure to
the correctional system.” 131 Idaho at 673, 962 P.2d at 1057. Leon, by contrast, is no first-time
offender or traffic-offenses-only offender by any stretch of the rap sheet. Since 2003, she has
accrued six juvenile misdemeanor offenses, including injury to a child and frequenting, and five
adult misdemeanor offenses, including two counts of petit theft (as well as probation violations).
(PSI, pp.5-8.) Leon’s record looks fairly habitual, and this felony conviction in adult court is an
escalation, and not an outlier. This does not weigh in favor a lighter sentence.
In any event, the district court was aware of these facts too, weighing Leon’s prior history
along with all the other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. (8/10/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.22-25.)
The court found, in light of the all the other facts of this case—including Leon’s “incidents of
untruthfulness throughout the PSI” and tendency to “blame[] other people” for her “issues and
absconding”—that a release into the community was an “undue risk.” (8/10/20 Tr., p.12, L.11 –
p.13, L.1.) These factors should not be reweighed on appeal. Deboer, Idaho Court of Appeals
Docket No. 47840, *5.
In light of the facts of this case and the information in the record Leon fails to show the
district court abused its discretion. Her sentence should be affirmed.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Leon’s judgment of conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Kale D. Gans
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Deputy Attorney General
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